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In the first part of my paper, I am going to propose a research program which 
will be exemplified in the second part. This research concerns organizational 
mass-media rhetoric in a sense to be sketched below.
1. Implied audience
Intended addressees are the audience the writer has in mind when designing 
his/her discourse. Interpreters basing on the texts can only tentatively recon-
struct the personal and social (i.e., linguistic) traits of the intended audience. 
The portrait of intended addressees need not coincide with the features of those 
whom the writer explicitly addresses. The philological analysis of political writ-
ings can only deal with features of implied and hypothetically ascribable ad-
dressees. When analyzing implied addressing, we analyze an author's intentions. 
Comparing the result with characteristics of historically known actual address-
ees, we may hope to obtain a deeper insight into the atmosphere of the totali-
tarian society. To this end, a linguistic classification of implied addressing of 
political discourse is in order.
Using the participial form of imply applied to an agent noun is not novel (see 
Fickert 1996, p. 137). The term implied author was first put forward by Booth 
(1961). The term implied reader was proposed by Wolfgang Iser, incorporating
both the prestructuring of the potential meaning by the text, and the reader's 
actualization of this potential through the reading process. It refers to the active 
nature of this process – which will vary historically from one age to another – 
and not to a typology of possible readers. (Iser 1978, p. xi)
In our case, the main concern of political discourse investigation is how the 
author expected his/her discourse to be interpreted, and if his/her expectations 
are justified.
An interpretive approach is especially suitable for studying political discourse, 
because, citing Umberto Eco (1979, p. 52), “[t]he laws governing textual inter-
pretation are the laws of an authoritarian regime which guide the individual in 
his every action, prescribing the ends for him and offering him means to attain 
them”.
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That is, readers reconstruct in a tentative way the inner world of the implied 
author, thus following his/her (implied) prescriptions.
On the other hand, with Culler, and continuing the conception of Roland Bar-
thes, we can say that
To read is to participate in the play of the text, to locate zones of resistance and 
transparency, to isolate forms and determine their content and then to treat that 
content in turn as a form with its own content, to follow, in short, the interplay 
of surface and envelope. (Culler 1975, p. 259)
I would like to stress that mass manipulation and symbol manipulation inter-
act in the discourse practices. Successful symbol manipulation depends upon 
the ability to appropriate the symbols consonant with mass perception: “These 
perceptions are extremely fluid, subject to fluctuations, and political success 
depends upon being able to strike the right chord at the right time.” (Bayley 
1985, p. 108).
Thus, in the days of Stalin and Brezhnev, the war metaphor predominated in 
Soviet political discourse; during the Perestroika era, it was superseded by the 
“ship” and “common home” metaphors.
In a famous book on literary criticism by Hirsch, we find the following epi-
graph from Northrop Frye:
It has been said of Boehme that his books are like a picnic to which the author 
brings the words and the reader the meanings. The remark may have been in-
tended as a sneer at Boehme, but it is an exact description of all works of liter-
ary art without exception. (Hirsch 1967, p. 1)
Expanding this metaphor, I would say that political discourse is in this sense 
something like fast food: it must both impress and digest well, that is, it must 
persuade, therefore its author has to take into consideration real and potential 
addressees.
In fact, some investigators believe that
the discourse aim of a political speech is persuasive, not referential; it is de-
coder-oriented, not object-oriented, and consequently, the whole problem of 
the relation holding between words and things may be beside the point. In per-
suasive discourse, the speaker tries to arouse an intention, inspire belief and 
motivate action, not to refer to objects in the real world, and it is useless to 
account empirically for non-observational general terms used for this purpose. 
(Bayley 1985, p. 104)
I would only like to note that the reference to implied addressees is an excep-
tion to this statement.
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2. Organizational rhetoric
Political discourse may be studied by a complex discipline of which political 
philology is only a branch itself consisting of two sub-branches, political lin-
guistics and political literary criticism. The main concern of political philology 
is investigating properties of discourse having to do with political concepts, 
such as power, influence, persuasion, and authority, in discourse production 
and interpretation. Unlike political scientists, proper, political philologists con-
sider these factors only in connection with linguistic behavior.
Properly speaking, our discipline may be called political rhetoric, because es-
sential to rhetoric is the notion of an audience as (a) person(s) whom the speaker 
or writer hopes to influence (Nystrand 1982, p. 5); cf. also the classical defini-
tion: “Auditoire, en matière rhétorique: l'ensemble de ceux sur lesquels l'orateur 
veut influer par son argumentation” (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1970, p. 25).
When talking about rhetoric, we have at least three senses: rhetoric is (1) the 
capacity to persuade others; (2) a practical realization of this ability; (3) an at-
tempt at persuasion, not always successful. Political rhetoric is not confined to 
verbal language: there is also visual, e.g., architectural, ‘rhetoric’. However, 
the core meaning of ‘rhetoric’ is the capacity to get others to do what its pos-
sessor wants, regardless of what they want, except to the extent that their 
desires limit what rhetoric might achieve: this, of course, is the “rhetoric of 
ideological manipulation and political seduction” (Wardy 1996, p. 1).
Rhetoric is the paying of attention to one's audience. Following McCloskey 
(1985, p. xviii) we can say: “Rhetoric is the proportioning of means to desires 
in speech. Rhetoric is an economics of language, the study of how scarce 
means are allocated to the insatiable desires of people to be heard”.
This is the dividing line between political rhetoric and political science proper, 
because rhetoric does not deal with truth directly; rhetoric is rather the art of 
speaking and the study of how to persuade people.
Stalin's persuasive strategies may be called organizational rhetoric because 
Stalin spoke for a certain party, the Bolshevik party. With Cheney (1991), we 
can define organizational rhetoric as the way organizations ‘speak’ to and en-
list the ‘voices’ of individual persons. Organizational rhetoric is the way an 
organization legitimizes its actions, cf.:
L'organisation légitime son action par un discours officiel, qui est à la fois un 
discours de motivation et un discours idéologique à vocation structurante. Il 
entretient une certaine représentation de la valeur, une idéologie. (Turcq 1985, 
p. 153)
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Characteristic of organizational rhetoric are “corporate messages”:
Thus, the person (or “mask”) of the organization became reified as a personal, 
individual agent; the organization became in effect a natural person [...] organi-
zational messages take on a relatively placeless, nameless, omniscient quality, 
even when a corporate identity is assumed and declared. That is, corporate mes-
sages tend to ‘de-center’ the self, the individual, the acting subject. (Cheney 
1991, p. 5)
Something like a Gravitation Law may be tentatively proposed here, explain-
ing this and other facts of this sort:
The higher the number of adherents to a party, the more attractive it is 
for outsiders who want to become integrated into this party as a result 
and become members of this mass.
The naming Bolsheviks of the party had no small share in framing the desti-
nies of the Communist Party because Bolshevik denotes “the great bulk”.
Somewhat simplifying, we can say that totalitarian politicians tell their audi-
ence, directly or indirectly: “Be what my implied addressees must be, and you'll 
be as happy and as progressive as them”.
Here are the most frequent means of achieving the aims of organization rheto-
ric in the days of Stalin and later on (Benn 1989, p. 85):
1. Didactic, repetitive explanation of the party's message with the aim of en-
suring so far as possible that the message reaches everybody. This was by 
far the most important part of the Soviet propaganda method, involving as 
it does, stress on correctness of content and efficiency of organization.
2. ‘Active involvement’ of individuals – through giving them tasks of politi-
cal or social importance – on the supposition that the fulfillment of these 
assignments will generate an increased sense of political commitment on 
the part of those concerned; and
3. The mobilization of group influence (or public opinion) against deviant 
attitudes or behavior.
These practices had many features in common with Fascist propaganda (see 
Ehlich 1989): the organizational rhetoric makes the audience exercise their re-
action in a pre-programmed way in the framework of the whole organization. 
In the Soviet Union, compulsory political education was one of the expedients. 
Commonplace people felt themselves important politicians when they discussed 
the latest political events and the practical politics of the Soviet government. 
Due to such exercises, the opinions of the Communist leaders took root in the 
mentality of the masses. By the way, now, long after Perestroika, older people 
sometimes miss such organizational rhetoric very much, they typically ask in 
interviews: “Whom have we to believe?” This reaction is normal: after so 
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many years of “political exercises” aimed at delivering the “right” (politically 
correct) interpretation of practically all events in the world, older people lack 
the ability to do it themselves, without the aid of party comrades.
Under Stalin's autocracy, when almost all power rested with the ruler, political 
discourse itself had certain specific features. The cluster of these features may 
be called “totalitarian discourse”, i.e., discourse serving to maintaining the sys-
tem of government where the ruling authority extends its power over all as-
pects of society and regulates every aspect of life. Totalitarian discourse is one 
of the specific political methods of socialization in the totalitarian society and 
serves such functions as the justification (for inward addressees) and extenua-
tion (for outward addressees) of its political institutions. The following, for 
example, belong to such institutions: the secret police, the banning of the op-
position, and the control of the media. As a result of persuasion, the existence 
of these oppressive methods seems normal to the inward addressees; the dis-
sentients, or “dissidents”, are considered outcasts by the inward addressees, 
rather than normal citizens.
How the speaker envisions his/her addressees, we can infer analyzing certain 
types of utterances, such as Schrotta/Visotschnig (1982, p. 126f.):
– overt and concealed assertions, containing prescriptions to act in a certain 
manner and to take a certain attitude;
– sentences which only look like questions but in reality contain an answer; 
only part of them are rhetorical questions in traditional sense;
– answers to a certain number of questions; stating which questions are an-
swered in the discourse and which remain unanswered, we can conclude 
what the author hoped would pass by his/her implied audience unnoticed;
– questions needing the author's cooperation with the audience in order to be 
answered;
– description of problems, from the perspective of the speaker and of the 
addressee;
– approaches to problem solution: in positive terms (we must do this and this) 
and in negative terms (this and this is unacceptable);
– “new” ideas, i.e. what the speaker supposes to be new to his/her audience;
– appeal to universality: what the speaker sees as a result of long delibera-
tion, as a god's truth or as an object of investigation;
– interpellations in the parliament and to the government
– call for help and help proposal, etc.
3. Direct and indirect forms of addressing the implied addressees
In the political career of the Bolshevik speakers one can distinguish at least 
three stages: before, during, and after attaining power. As a consequence, the 
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explicit and implicit addressing of their political writings varies. Trotzky ex-
perienced all three stages, as well as Khrustchov and Gorbachev after him. 
However, some speakers did not have the third stage because of their natural 
(Lenin and Stalin) or political death (Bukharin).
On a large corpus of practically complete works of Lenin, Trotzky, and Stalin 
I have undertaken a statistical investigation of how they use the personal pro-
nouns of the 1st and of the 2nd person and compared the results with fictional 
literature on the one hand, and with the writings of several less prominent 
revolutionaries on the other. Russian possesses a declension system helping 
to determine in what semantic role a noun is used. These data are exposed in 
Table 1.1
Pronouns
Political writings Fiction
Lenin Bukharin Stalin Trotzky Rykov Tolstoy Bely Gorky Chekhov
1 sg. 24.77 15.84 25.75 31.69 25.63 60.30 44.63 58.75 56.45
Nom. Ja 16.37 10.48 21.11 20.05 19.17 34.43 23.94 32.08 30.95
Acc./Gen.
/Loc.
Menja
1.83 1.81 1.32 3.80 1.14 8.77 0.48 10.66 8.54
Dat. Mne 2.98 2.24 2.04 4.42 3.25 11.19 7.46 11.31 9.92
Instr-1 
Mnoj 0.75 0.12 0.15 0.34 0.30 0.84 1.07 0.77 0.62
Instr-2 
Mnoju 0.69 0.19 0.20 0.67 0.47 0.54 0.74 1.11 0.40
Possess. 
Moj...(my) 2.15 1.08 0.93 2.42 1.31 4.56 6.59 3.61 6.02
1 1 sg. corresponds to English ‘I’, ‘me’, etc. 2 sg. corresponds to French ‘toi’/‘tu’, German 
‘du’, etc.; in English, ‘you’ is used for both 2 sg. and 2 pl. 1 pl. corresponds to the English 
‘we’, ‘us’, etc. 2 pl. corresponds to French ‘vous’, German ‘ihr’ and polite ‘Sie’. Nom.: 
Nominative, or agentive case. Acc.: Accusative, or objective case, the case of direct object; 
formally it coincides with the Genitive (Gen.) and the Locative (Loc.) cases of these pro-
nouns, although there is a formal difference in other word classes of Russian. Dat.: Dative, 
or benefactive case. Instr.: Instrumental case. In our material, it is mostly the form of pro-
nominal subject in passive constructions and less frequently, the case of indirect objects (like 
the English ‘to be content with something’). There are two variants of this form: Instr-1, 
‘mnoj’, ‘toboj’, is more colloquial than Instr-2, ‘mnoju’ (“by me”), ‘toboju’ (“by you”). 
Instr-2 sounded old-fashioned even at the beginning of the 20th century. Using the old-
fashioned ‘mnoju’, ‘toboju’, the speaker wants to say: “I am old-fashioned because I am 
older and therefore more experienced than most of you.” As we can see, such stressing of 
“superiority” is more typical for the writings of Trotzky and Gorky. Poss.: Possessive adjec-
tival forms, corresponding to English ‘my’, ‘your’, ‘our’, etc.
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Pronouns
Political writings Fiction
Lenin Bukharin Stalin Trotzky Rykov Tolstoy Bely Gorky Chekhov
2 sg. 0.95 0.76 1.32 1.33 0.07 12.08 9.69 18.50 13.48
Nom. Ty 0.55 0.41 0.65 0.69 0.04 6.48 5.69 11.43 5.84
Acc./Gen.
/Loc. Tebja 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.04 2.07 1.26 2.84 2.54
Dat. Tebe 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.21 0 2.21 0.67 2.77 2.58
Instr-1 
Toboj 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 0.37 0.44 0.57 0.44
Instr-2 
Toboju 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.08
Poss. Tvoj 0.12 0 0.13 0.17 0 0.89 1.45 0.01 2.01
1 pl. 66.75 75.65 58.61 55.38 69.27 12.10 40.16 7.69 6.30
Nom. My 41.32 45.46 32.09 33.00 48.28 6.56 20.70 3.69 3.08
Acc./Gen.
/Loc. Nas 10.92 15.63 15.12 10.58 9.72 2.53 8.79 2.01 1.90
Dat. Nam 8.15 7.34 7.02 7.13 6.23 2.02 7.16 1.33 0.79
Instr Nami 3.35 2.99 1.79 2.67 3.38 0.48 2.41 0.37 0.18
Poss. Nash 2.49 4.21 2.60 2.00 1.68 0.50 1.09 0.29 0.35
2 pl. 7.51 7.75 14.29 11.60 5.03 15.52 5.53 14.27 23.77
Nom. Vy 5.04 4.97 8.91 6.40 3.28 7.07 3.04 8.07 8.96
Acc./Gen.
/Loc. Vas 0.83 1.13 2.02 2.07 0.37 3.57 1.15 3.04 5.35
Dat. Vam 1.3 1.21 2.66 2.09 0.87 3.70 0.87 2.46 6.41
Instr. Vami 0.19 0.38 0.46 0.63 0.37 0.66 0.34 0.46 0.83
Poss. Vaš 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.41 0.13 0.54 0.12 0.24 2.19
Sum total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 1: Percentage of pronominal forms in political and fictional writings before and soon 
after the Russian October Revolution in 1917
Fictional usage differs drastically from political usage. Lenin (1870-1924), 
Bukharin,2 Stalin (1878-1953), Trotzky 3 and Alexej Rykov (Russian Bolshe-
vik economist, repressed in 1937) use ‘we’/‘us’ more frequently than ‘I’/‘me’. 
2 Nikolaj Bukharin (1888-1938) between 1918 and 1929 was the chief editor of the newspaper 
“Pravda”; he was also one of the founders of the Third International, “Komintern”. 1938 he 
was eliminated by Stalin.
3 Trotzky (1879-1940) was one of the main organizers of the Russian Revolution in 1917. 
Later he was expelled from the Communist Party and exiled abroad in 1927.
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Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910, the great Russian writer), Andrey Bely (1880-1934, 
Russian symbolist poet, anti-Bolshevik, returned to the Soviet Russia after 
emigration), Maxim Gorky,4 and Anton Chekhov (1860-1904, the great Rus-
sian writer) apparently prefer the ‘I’/‘me’ forms to ‘we’/‘us’.
The use of ‘you’ (both singular, like the French ‘tu’, and plural, like the French 
‘vous’), that is ‘ty’ and ‘vy’, is rather infrequent in the “Revolutionary” usage; 
but the classics of Russian literature of the early 20th century vary considerably 
in this regard, differing both from the politicians and from each other. What is 
common to both groups of writers is that they most commonly use the Nomi-
native forms of all of these pronouns; next in frequency to them is the Accusa-
tive/Genitive/Locative form of these pronouns. This may be interpreted as the 
predisposition of the Russian speakers to naming personal agents rather than 
personal benefactives and instrumentals.
Closer examination proved that the functions of ‘we’/‘us’ in political writings 
differ, too. Lenin and Trotzky differ from Stalin in the number of “authorial” 
uses of ‘we’, i.e., “we” refers to the author, which is fairly infrequent in Anglo-
Saxon writings, but very usual in Russian academic treatises. Lenin's and Trotz-
ky's styles remind us, in the first stages of their political development, of ac-
ademic Russian writing, where even today such use is regular, denoting a 
writer's modesty. ‘I’ (Russian ‘ja’) does not sound as modest as ‘we’ (Russian 
‘my’) in an academic paper.
Abstracting from the statistic and semantic differences in use of case forms, as 
well as from relative frequency of different ways of reference to implied and 
to explicit addressees, let me list the following classes of use of ‘we’ (Russian 
‘my’) in the political writings of Lenin, Trotzky, and Stalin.
3.1 ‘We’ in Lenin's writings
In Lenin's writings we find following reference of ‘we’ (Russian ‘my’):
‘We’ refers to “Author”: “Such an ‘interpretation’, however, is the crudest 
distortion of Marxism, advantageous only to the bourgeoisie; in point of 
theory, it is based on a disregard for the most important circumstances and 
considerations indicated, say, in Engels' ‘summary’ argument we have just 
quoted in full.” (Lenin 1917: The State And Revolution)
4 Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), the most prominent ‘proletarian revolutionary writer’, was very 
close to the Bolsheviks, especially to Lenin. Soon after the October Revolution he left Rus-
sia and spent several years abroad. Upon Stalin's invitation he returned to the Soviet Russia 
where he died.
1.
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‘We’ refers to “Bolsheviks”, for example: “It is the minutes of the Party 
Congress, and they alone, that show us how far we have really succeeded 
in making a clean sweep of the survivals of the old, purely circle ties and 
substituting for them a single great party tie.” (Lenin 1904: One Step For-
ward, Two Steps Back: The Crisis In Our Party)
3.2 ‘We’ in Trotzky's writings
In Trotzky's writings we find the following classes of use:
‘We’ refers to “Author”: “The spirit of the Inquisition thoroughly impreg-
nating the atmosphere of the country feeds, as we have already said.” 
(Trotzky 1937: The Stalin School of Falsification)
‘We’ refers to “Author + audience”: “While it is true that Russia's econo-
my, as well as Russian politics, always developed under the direct influence 
– or rather, the pressure – of European politics and economy, the form and 
depth of this influence, as we have seen, changed constantly.” (Trotzky 
1905)
‘We’ refers to “Author + audience” meaning “Bolsheviks or Marxists”: 
“But, even if we admit this purely liberal standpoint, even here our accuser 
will prove to be completely in the wrong.” (Trotzky 1920: Terrorism or 
Communism [Dictatorship versus Democracy]: A Reply to Karl Kautsky)
‘We’ refers to “Bolsheviks and/or Marxists”, but not necessarily including 
the audience: “The fate of the Russian Revolution is so inseparably bound 
up with the fate of European Socialism, and we Russian Socialists stand so 
firmly on the ground of internationalism, that we cannot, we must not for a 
moment, entertain the idea of purchasing the doubtful liberation of Russia 
by the certain destruction of the liberty of Belgium and France, and – what 
is more important still – thereby inoculating the German and Austrian pro-
letariat with the virus of imperialism.” (Trotzky 1914: The War and the In-
ternational: The Bolsheviks and World Peace)
‘We’ refers to “Russia”: “In our war against Czarism, in which we have 
never known a «national» truce, we have never looked for help from Habs-
burg or Hohenzollern militarism, and we are not looking for it now.” (Trotz-
ky 1914: The War and the International: The Bolsheviks and World Peace)
3.3 ‘We’ in Stalin's use
Most characteristic of Stalin's use is including the implied audience in the 
sphere of ‘we’ (‘my’). Thus, we find the following cases in his writings:
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Valerij Dem'jankov82
“Author + audience (= Bolsheviks)”: “We, however, cannot live and develop 
in that way, comrades. The policy of a «middle» line in matters of princi-
ple is not our policy.” (Stalin 1926: The Seventh Enlarged Plenum Of The 
E.C.C.I., November 22 - December 16, 1926)
“Author + audience”, not necessarily Bolsheviks: “If we take the history of 
our Party from the moment of its inception in 1903 in the form of the Bol-
shevik group, and follow its successive stages down to our day, we can say 
without exaggeration that the history of our Party has been the history of a 
struggle of contradictions within the Party.” (Stalin 1926: The Seventh En-
larged Plenum Of The E.C.C.I., November 22 - December 16, 1926)
‘We’ refers to “Russia”: “We terminated the war with complete victory over 
our enemies – this is the principal summation of the war.” (Stalin 1946: 
Speech delivered at a meeting of voters of the Stalin Electoral District, 
Moscow February 9, 1946)
‘We’ refers to “Bolsheviks and Russia”: “We Are Building and Can Com-
pletely Build the Economic Basis of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.” (Stalin 1926: 
The Seventh Enlarged Plenum Of The E.C.C.I., November 22 - December 16, 
1926)
Stalin's prevalent reference of ‘we’ was: (1) the group of Bolsheviks of whom 
he was but one and who were “side-participants”, to use the terminology of 
Clark/Carlson (1982); this use prevails in Stalin's reminiscences of the pre-
October era; and (2) “we and you”, during the Soviet era: the whole of the 
Soviet people, who, by definition, follow their Bolshevik leaders.
During Stalin's ministry, people thought: “Stalin is what we are, since he does 
not look to live better than we, there is no way of living better now, so let's rely 
on him, because he always lives up to his promises. There are so many defor-
mations only because he does not know about them.”
4. Conclusion
Beginning totalitarian, politicians trying to attain to power must learn by the 
example of Lenin and Trotzky. That is, if you are emulous of power and try to 
attain to the power, build a group and attract your audience by bright and ex-
travagant behavior, terrorism included, promise as much as they can believe you 
are able to fulfill, etc. But do not overestimate credulity of your audience.
Unlike many others, in 1917 the Bolsheviks promised just what was most ac-
tually at that moment. People kept thinking: “They must rule us, and they'll 
resolve all our problems.” At that stage, the pronoun ‘we’ is allowed not to refer 
to the audience, it was rather used with reference to the author himself or her-
1.
2.
3.
4.
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self, or referring to the group of bright Bolsheviks whom people believed to 
become better rulers than the actual ones. Just like in Lenin's and in Trotzky's 
case.
However, if you want to retain the power, follow the lessons of Stalin and 
Brezhnev. Now, having attained to power, you can prolong your authority if 
you give the impression that you are like all of “them”, i.e., the people you 
rule: you are just one of them, whose interests are equal to theirs, that you do 
not have personal interests or only minimal interest of retaining power, etc. 
Stalin, whose ‘we’ mostly referred to the audience plus the speaker, may be 
said to follow this linguistic tactic of retaining power. His super-ego dictated 
him this kind of referring.
In a way, the inclusive ‘we’ (meaning ‘I and you’) correlated with addressing 
people as ‘comrades’. Soon after the October Revolution, the majority of Rus-
sians still used a different addressing form, ‘gospodin’/‘gospozha’ (correspond-
ing to ‘Mr.’/‘Madam’, ‘Monsieur’/‘Madame’, etc.) practically forbidden later 
in Soviet everyday life. ‘Comrade’ had a connotation of friendliness and was 
opposed to the less cordial ‘grazhdanin’ (‘citizen’), used especially in ad-
dressing convicts and non-proletarian layers of society (cf. ‘citoyen’ in the days 
of the Great French Revolution). In the writings of Lenin, Stalin and Trotzky, 
‘tovarisch’ (‘comrade’) referred to friends, to the affinity group, the like-
minded fellows. This connotation disappeared later, so that under Khruschev 
and Brezhnev in the 1960s, in the 1970s and in the 1980s, ‘comrade’ did not 
sound as friendly as before.
This use of the inclusive ‘we’ may be characterized as aggressive in the fol-
lowing sense. The speaker involves the audience in his/her personal space with-
out ever asking permission; the “perfect audience” complies with authoritarian 
leaders. The Russian way of using ‘we’ conduces this tactic to success. Be-
cause of this involvement, the audience, for instance, the common Soviet truck 
drivers or the kolkhoz farmers, felt themselves as prominent politicians on 
whom the destiny of the world depended. Using ‘we’ with reference to his/
her implied addressee, the author lowers the addressee's resistance to 
persuasion.
Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the predecessors of the “reader criticism”, wrote: 
“When I picture a perfect reader, I always picture a monster of courage and 
curiosity, also something supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and 
discoverer.” (cited according to Wolfreys 2000, p. vii).
I think Lenin's, Stalin's and Trotzky's implied readers had to be far from be-
ing perfect in this sense. They had to be as naïve as not to see the manipulative 
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maneuvers in the discourse of the Soviet leaders. However, this was not al-
ways true of real readers, who were very often far from being the political 
ideal of the totalitarian society.
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